国际政治经济学2019年最佳论文TOP10评选：候选论文摘要

《世界经济年鉴》编辑部，2020.07.10

（一）国际政治经济学（马克思主义部分）2019年最佳论文TOP10候选论文

　　1.国际政治经济学（马克思主义部分）2019年最佳中文论文TOP10候选论文

　　【XC01】平台经济全球化的政治经济学分析　　谢富胜、吴越、王生升（2019），《中国社会科学》，第12期，第页。

　　作为适应数字技术体系的资本积累和社会生产与再生产的新组织形式,平台经济依靠高效的数据采集和传输系统、发达的算力以及功能强大的数据处理算法所支持的数字平台,跨时空跨国界跨部门地集成社会生产、分配、交换与消费活动,大力促进了社会生产力发展。在平台经济中,数字平台的技术特性及资本对平台的垄断,塑造了动态不完全竞争格局,基于数字平台的劳动组织新形式导致不稳定的就业和工资,使资本积累的逻辑渗入劳动力再生产过程。资本主义条件下的平台经济仍然无法克服资本积累规律揭示的内在矛盾。

　　【XC02】世界再生产体系研究：理论模型与经验证据　　乔晓楠、张月莹、吴雨婷（2019），《世界经济》，第5期，第3-26页。

　　马克思在《资本论》中系统阐述了社会再生产理论,但是该理论以封闭经济为前提假设。本文将封闭经济拓展为开放经济,引入国际贸易,进而分别从国家和世界两个维度考察世界再生产体系。在国家维度,国际贸易的存在将显著改变一国两大部类之间的比例关系。在世界维度,各国在世界两大部类生产中所扮演的国际分工角色将决定其国际贸易特征。基于上述理论,本文进一步利用世界投入产出表对世界再生产体系进行测度,并且以2000和2009年为例考察了世界再生产体系的演进。

　　【XC03】马克思对资本主义自由贸易的本质批判及当代价值　　刘顺、周泽红（2019），《马克思主义研究》，第6期，第144-152页。

　　自由贸易和与自由贸易相对的保护关税议题,不仅是马克思开始关注经济问题的一个关键线索,而且是其对资本主义展开多重批判的一个重要始点。在他看来,资本家口中所标榜的"自由贸易",完全是在资本主义制度范围内兜圈子,本质上只不过是资产阶级不同利益集团对生产体系进行调节的一种权宜手段,也是资本主义强国牺牲他国利益而聚敛财富的一种单边自由。他深刻认识到自由贸易历史作用的二重性,但仅仅在"加速社会革命"意义上才赞成资本主义自由贸易。马克思这种宝贵思想,虽然距今170载但仍具有穿越时空的重大价值,有助于我们认清西方"自由贸易"的历史真相与话语陷阱,是一套深刻解释经济全球化新变局和科学驾驭经济全球化的理论利器。

　　【XC04】全球生产网络视角的供给侧结构性改革——基于政治经济学的理论逻辑和经验证据　　谢富胜、高岭、谢佩瑜（2019），《管理世界》，第11期，第89-101、118页。

　　本文从经济全球化进程考察中国经济发展的阶段性特征。研究发现,我国自2000年左右深度融入全球生产网络所形成的投资、出口联动增长模式支撑了2000～2007年的高速增长,新常态源于支撑2000年以来增长模式的社会经济条件遭到破坏。在适应和引领新常态的过程中,供给侧结构性改革可以把过剩的产能转移到中部农村地区的地下管网建设,修复资本的同时推进乡村振兴战略。与此同时,企业要努力建设关键部件开发平台,推进关键部件创新,获得全球制造的标准制定权。通过构建集成创新的核心企业和不同层次的模块化生产企业之间的国内生产网络,满足我国标准化需求和个性化需求并存的动态需求结构。

　　【XC05】本文从经济全球化进程考察中国经济发展的阶段性特征。研究发现,我国自2000年左右深度融入全球生产网络所形成的投资、出口联动增长模式支撑了2000～2007年的高速增长,新常态源于支撑2000年以来增长模式的社会经济条件遭到破坏。在适应和引领新常态的过程中,供给侧结构性改革可以把过剩的产能转移到中部农村地区的地下管网建设,修复资本的同时推进乡村振兴战略。与此同时,企业要努力建设关键部件开发平台,推进关键部件创新,获得全球制造的标准制定权。通过构建集成创新的核心企业和不同层次的模块化生产企业之间的国内生产网络,满足我国标准化需求和个性化需求并存的动态需求结构。　　宋树理、姚庐清（2019），《世界经济》，第11期，第3-26页。

　　【XC06】论美国对华“贸易战”的本质——基于《帝国主义论》视角　　陈江生、沈非、张滔（2019），《帝国主义论》视角”，《马克思主义研究》，第11期，第69-79页。

　　本文从列宁《帝国主义论》的视角对美国对华"贸易战"的本质进行了马克思主义政治经济学分析。我们认为,冷战结束后的美国仍然具有帝国主义的生产集中和垄断、金融寡头控制、资本输出、形成国际垄断同盟以及瓜分与重新瓜分世界等五个基本特征。美国基本上还是列宁所指的帝国主义国家。中国的崛起影响了美国在世界商品市场和金融市场中的垄断地位,因此,美国对中国进行遏制和打击也就成为必然。"贸易战"就是美国当前对华采取的遏制和打击手段。因此美国对华"贸易战"的本质是维护其垄断地位。不过,当前世界仍处在从资本主义向社会主义过渡的大时代,虽然帝国主义依然具有强大实力,但是其寄生性和腐朽性决定了帝国主义必然走向衰败,美国对华"贸易战"也终将以失败告终。

　　2.国际政治经济学（马克思主义部分）2019年最佳英文论文TOP10候选论文

　　【XE01】Amplifying the Contradictions: The Centrifugal BRICS　　Garcia, A. & Bond, P. (2019). Socialist Register, 55..

　　The formation of the Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS) network is one of the main features of twenty-first century geopolitics, far exceeding in scope the investment strategy in BRIC economies that was identified by a senior Goldman Sachs banker, Jim O’Neill, in 2001. O’Neill may have kick-started this process as part of the standard Goldman Sachs approach to investment ‘churning’ (by 2013 the bank shut down its BRIC fund after poor returns), but it took on a life of its own. In 2006, a meeting between BRIC countries took place on the margins of the United Nations General Assembly. However, it was with the global financial crisis that the economic role of the BRICS gained prominence, especially insofar as financial bailouts and currency printing initially failed to restore growth, leaving the Chinese and Indian economies as drivers of global capitalism.

　　Amidst two decades of unprecedened economic growth and significant political developments across the BRICS regimes, grand claims have been offered about the way BRICS will rebalance the world and ensure good global governance. This essay considers the opposite, namely that a resurgent imperialism is being facilitated by BRICS politics. This functions in three ways. First, global capitalist crisis tendencies are amplified by centrifugal forces emanating from BRICS economies. Second, the neoliberal character of multilateral institutions, especially in the spheres of finance, trade, and climate politics, is also amplified as the BRICS gain a seat at the table. Third, BRICS-based corporations, along with their states acting in a subimperial manner, are vital forces in super-exploitative accumulation within their respective regions and beyond. In our view, the centripetal forces supposedly pulling the world more tightly together through globalization had by 2018 reached their limits, and centrifugal pressures had begun to emerge. The BRICS were now very much part of a world turned upside down, and in many respects driving the process.

　　【XE02】Decoupling is a Myth: Asian Capitalism in the Global Disarray　　Ghosh, J. (2019). Socialist Register, 55.

　　The last decade has demolished a myth widely perpetrated during the earlier boom: that of ‘decoupling’, or the divergence of growth in some major emerging markets (such as China, India and Brazil) from that of the advanced economies. This over-optimistic perception derived from only a very short period in the 2000s, essentially from 2002-08. Over this period, the advanced economies expanded by around 2 per cent per annum, while the emerging markets and developing countries grew faster and at accelerating rates. But the ‘Global Financial Crisis’ that then erupted put paid to that, and this brief divergence turned out to be an aberration from the longer historical trend. Both the global crisis and the subsequent period have unfortunately confirmed the continued economic dependence of the periphery on the capitalist core of the world economy. The unfolding of this global crisis was perhaps the most striking example of this: while it originated in the United States and then spread to Europe, it immediately affected the emerging markets in the developing world, even those with current account surpluses and other signs of economic strength, by impacting on cross-border capital flows. Since then, GDP growth rates of these two categories of economies have generally moved together. Indeed, because emerging and developing countries had higher growth rates earlier, they have experienced sharper slowdowns subsequently.

　　【XE03】China's New Globalism　　Chun, L. (2019). Socialist Register, 55.

　　The traditions of communist revolution and socialist internationalism, which once defined the People’s Republic of China, have today faded into the distant past. The programme of ‘reform and opening’ market integration that began in 1978, intensified especially since 1992, has now evolved into an all-round globalism that guides China’s domestic and foreign policies. Free trade is promulgated in a peculiar rhetoric of socialism that embraces a ‘common destiny for the human community’ along with a cooperative relationship between the ‘G2’. At the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) 19th National Congress in October 2017, President Xi Jinping declared that ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics has entered a new era’.

　　This essay, after a brief background account of China’s departure from socialist internationalism and global repositioning, will critically assess the dominant official ideological justifications for globalism in China. Along the way, three propositions are advanced. First, China’s partially dependent development since undertaking market reforms is unsustainable and cannot be emulated by others. Second, China must address its own serious problems before it can offer the world anything morally appealing or practically feasible: the success of China’s overland and overseas adventures will depend on the creation of a humanly and environmentally sound domestic social model. Third, China’s outward quest for energy and other resources comes with serious perils amidst the realpolitik of American hegemony and militarism. It is in this context that the essay concludes by asking whether China can reasonably be expected to regain the ability to positively reshape the global political economy.

　　【XE04】Locating Trump: Paleoconservatism, Neoliberalism, and Anti-Globalization　　Kiely, R. (2019). Socialist Register, 55.

　　Long before Trump, paleoconservatives like Pat Buchanan were calling for an end to all immigration, removal of ‘illegal’ immigrants, the closure of military bases overseas, massive cuts to government spending, the introducing economic protectionism, and the need to wage a conservative counterattack in the culture wars. It is precisely here that we can see some of the tensions between (and within) paleoconservative and neoliberal ideals, and the reality of the US (and indeed global) political economy. In one respect, Trump represents a re-politicization of the world in the face of the technocratic de-politicization of actually existing neoliberalism since the 1980s. This also feeds into the populist discourse in which technocratic economism has existed alongside competition, so that the losers in this competitive game – individuals, localities, even countries – are somehow less worthy precisely because they have lost. Seen in this way, there is indeed a populist backlash, but one in which recourse to notions of the white working class oversimplifies.

　　But if Trump represents a re-politicizing response to neoliberal depoliticization, then does his presidency represent a break with neoliberalism? A clear, black-and-white answer cannot be provided because neoliberalism is itself ambiguous. As we have seen, while neoliberalism carries the promise of spontaneity, freedom, and the market, it continually relies on constructing markets, and the state is central to carrying out this project. Even the project of marketization always relies on something outside of the market, such as the sovereign state. While technocratic neoliberalism has been dominant in recent years, neoliberalism can also involve de-politicization through authoritarian rule. There are some parallels here with the radical conservatives of 1930s Germany, as Trump can be seen as an attempt to reenchant a world of bureaucratic rationalisation (albeit this time one where the rationalization has occurred through the market). Ordoliberalism emerged in the 1930s as an authoritarian liberal response to Weimar and an alternative to the Nazis. A number of ordoliberals shared views close to Schmitt’s case for the sovereign to exercise exceptional power in response to the politicization of the economy.

　　【XE05】The Contradictions of Global Migration　　Hanieh, A. (2019). Socialist Register, 55.

　　What is it about the present moment that has propelled the issue of migration to the centre of political debate, and how should we respond to the emergence of Trumpism and other anti-migrant movements across the globe? For many, the answers to these questions are largely found at an ideological level, with the rise of a newly branded right representing a resurgence of protectionism, a narrow parochial outlook, and a national chauvinism epitomized in slogans such as ‘Make America Great Again’. Running through most conventional perspectives is a conception of migration as a contingent epiphenomenon of the world economy; one that arises from a variety of factors ‘somewhere else’ and ends up at ‘our’ borders demanding a policy response. In this essay, I propose that this framing is not only false, but that it also leads to a set of political problems for those concerned with building campaigns to support migrant struggles today. In place of such perspectives, I argue that we need to situate migration as an internal feature of how capitalism actually functions at the global scale – a movement of people that is relentlessly generated by the movement of capital, and which, in turn, is constitutive of the concrete forms of capitalism itself. Only from this global perspective can we understand the recent rise of racism and xenophobia, and the profound changes in how borders operate and are managed throughout much of the world. Most importantly, such a perspective allows us to sketch what an effective solidarity with migrants might look like.

　　In making this argument, I focus on three interconnected features of migration in the current period. First, I examine how migration arises from the inherent dynamics of capitalism: a totalising system of accumulation that continually generates multiple forms of dispossession. I then turn to look at the instrumental role of borders in these dynamics, analysing the ways in which borders act to demarcate various forms of difference within national and global labour markets (including the value of labour power, and the construction of categories such as race and illegality). Finally, migration is also essential to how periods of crisis unfold and are perceived – a theme that is explored in the final section of this essay. Precisely because of the centrality of migration to capital accumulation, a very large proportion of the world’s population has been integrated into global financial circuits through the sending and receiving of remittances. At moments of economic downturn, this relationship permits the (partial) spatial displacement of crisis through the corridors of migration and remittance flows. Moreover, migration itself is frequently portrayed in terms of ‘crisis’ – most notably in the case of the millions of people now displaced across the Middle East and around the Mediterranean Sea. In this latter case, I show how the framing of migration as crisis is being utilized as a means to further deepen neoliberal market-led development models throughout much of the affected region.

　　【XE06】Unequal Exchange in the Age of Globalization　　Ricci, A. (2019). Review of Radical Political Economics, 51(2), 225–245.

　　Unequal exchange arises when spatial production of value is disjointed from its geographical distribution. A disaggregated monetary model of the world economy is presented on the grounds of Marx’s labor theory of value. All the forms of unequal exchange in international trade are explained, on the basis of a coherent definition of the forms of international value of traded commodities. Estimates of value transfers for recent years show the ongoing relevance of the unequal exchange in the modern capitalist world economy. JEL classifications: B51, D46, F63 Keywords unequal exchange, Marxist value theory, international trade, globalization

　　3.国际政治经济学（其他部分）2019年最佳中文论文TOP10候选论文

　　【PC01】理解百年未有之大变局　　张宇燕（2019），《国际经济评论》，第5期，第9-19、4页。

　　2018年6月习近平主席对当今全球态势做出一个重要判断,即世界正处于百年未有之大变局。这一判断是笔者分析和把握现阶段纷繁复杂世界、顺应时代潮流、利用好发展机遇并成功应对挑战的出发点。对百年变局的理解可以从大国实力对比变化、科技进步影响深远并伴随众多不确定性、民众权利意识普遍觉醒、人口结构改变、国际货币体系演化、多边体系瓦解与重建、美国内部制度颓势显露和中美博弈加剧等八个维度进行。在百年变局背景下,还应特别关注那些没有发生明显变化的因素。正是这些"变"与"未变",构成了中国未来发展的国际大环境。

　　【PC02】超越地缘政治——产业政策与大国竞争　　雷少华（2019），《世界经济与政治》，第5期，第131-154、160页。

　　从整个冷战后的国际关系史来看,大国之间的直接军事冲突不但规模有限,而且程度可控,这是因为核武器的毁灭性后果急剧提升了战争的成本。军备与战争依然是大国之间竞争和冲突的重要形式,但是在全球化时代,随着新技术、新产业的快速发展,地缘政治与军备竞争的效用逐步降低。当今世界的大国竞争已经不仅是军备竞赛和GDP数值的较量,还是持续创新与快速应用的产业链之间的竞争。在一个先进技术占据主导地位的世界中,竞争的本质变化导致安全的内涵发生了巨大改变:从如何防止战争逐渐转向如何确保产业安全。全球化重塑了全球产业结构,大国竞争的本质也转向了产业政策竞争。谁控制了从低端到高端的全产业链,谁就控制了全球产业结构。产业结构决定了经济实力和军事技术,而经济实力和军事技术决定了国家安全,因此产业结构的质量和安全决定着国家安全。在全球化时代,主导竞争的最重要因素是产业政策、尖端技术和市场规模,而大国竞争的本质是产业政策的竞争。

　　【PC03】特朗普政府的贸易保护主义政策——基于政党政治的研究视角　　李杨、孙俊成（2019），《美国研究》，第3期，第43-59、6页。

　　特朗普执政以来,美国政府的贸易保护主义政策呈现出不同于以往的理念和特征,这同美国当前政党政治的需要和变化密切相关。政党政治是美国政治体系当中的重要组成部分,两党之间为争夺对政府或国会的控制权的博弈贯穿于公共政策的整个决策过程,贸易政策特别是对华贸易政策更是双方争相使用的重要工具。特朗普政府的贸易保护主义是以逆全球化的经济民族主义和国家参与的"对等贸易"为理念,从外在表现形式来看,具有贸易保护手段更为直接、更为立体、对华贸易态度更为强硬、以维护美国经济霸权为核心目标四个鲜明特征。究其原因,贸易保护主义在本质上依然是美国政党政治的工具:它是共和党和特朗普谋取两党力量比较优势和总统选举的重要工具,是他们参与国际政治博弈以纾解来自国内政治压力的工具,是两党对贸易保护发展路径依赖的制度性工具,更是特朗普及共和党应对国会中期选举和2020年总统竞选连任的现实有效工具。

　　【PC04】特朗普政府对中美经贸关系的重构——基于经济民粹主义和经济民族主义视角的考察　　罗振兴（2019），《美国研究》，第5期，第76-102、7页。

　　中美建交以来,美国历届政府都力图将中国纳入美国主导的以规则为基础的世界贸易体系,特朗普政府则偏离了这一传统,其对华贸易政策发生了根本性的转向,转向了以权力为基础的双边博弈体系。特朗普执政以来,其重构中美贸易关系的构想正在逐步转化为政策,大规模对华贸易战等诸多极端贸易政策也付诸了实施。特朗普政府运用"安全化"这一过程,将极端的经济主张转化为国家安全问题,从而在政府内部达成最大程度的共识,由此将其看似不合经济逻辑的激进主张转化为合法的、可执行的政策。特朗普政府重构中美经贸关系动力源自经济民粹主义和经济民族主义,二者短期内不会沉寂,意味中美经贸摩擦将呈现出常态化、复杂化和长期化的特点,但短期内很难实现其公平、对等和平衡的双边贸易关系之理想。

　　【PC05】中国对外经贸战略调整符合自身战略利益　　余智（2019），《国际经济评论》，第2期，第98-111、6页。

　　为落实中美两国领导与相关部门关于经贸问题的历次会谈精神,化解中美贸易摩擦,中国最近一年多来在对外经贸战略上做出了一些调整。这些调整,不仅是为了展现谈判诚意、回应美方诉求,更是中国自身发展的需要,符合中国自身的战略利益。本文以中国自身战略利益为出发点,从对外贸易战略、产业发展战略、知识产权战略三个方面,论述中方对外经贸战略调整的必要性,以及应该采取的进一步调整措施。

　　【PC06】中国经济伙伴网络中的多重制度联系　　孙忆、孙宇辰（2019），《世界经济与政治》，第4期，第101-128、159-160页。

　　中国正逐渐成为国际经济外交舞台上的关键角色。通过与多个对象国签订自由贸易协定、本币互换协议等经济协议,中国正以制度化的方式构建经济伙伴关系网络。在经济伙伴的选择上,伙伴国对华贸易依赖度及其与中国的政治立场相似度是影响中国能否与之构建多重制度联系的核心因素,对华贸易依赖度更高或政治立场与中国更一致的伙伴对象更容易与中国形成多重制度联系。不仅如此,这两大核心因素也影响多重制度联系的构建方式。对于立场相似度高且对华贸易依赖度强的对象国,中国有更大可能先与其签订政治意味较强的经济协议,释放强烈的政治信号并确立该国在中国经济伙伴网络中的结点地位;其他情况下,中国则可能与对象国先签订政治意味稍弱的经济协议,逐步深化合作并为继续签订难度更大的经济协议铺垫基础。模型检验与案例分析的结果均支持了这一结论。这些发现有助于深入理解中国经济伙伴网络的构建逻辑,并为未来针对不同伙伴国有的放矢地制定经济外交政策提供启示。

　　【PC07】逆全球化的实质与中国的对策　　张端（2019），《马克思主义研究》，第3期，第122-129页。

　　以英国脱欧、美国总统大选为标志的逆全球化现象不断涌现,导致这一现象产生的原因是多方面的。其中,西方国家内部贫富差距的拉大、发达国家与发展中国家的发展差距以及西方国家移民问题的凸显等社会问题是其产生的直接原因。经济全球化作为客观历史运动过程,一方面反映了人类社会发展的客观趋势,另一方面由于经济全球化主导力量的资本主义属性,决定了其所具有的不平等性和剥削性,而逆全球化现象恰恰反映了西方资本主义国家为了维护其经济全球化主导地位所进行的策略调整。以习近平同志为核心的党中央准确把握世界发展大势,顺应经济全球化的发展趋势,理性分析逆全球化现象,提出构建人类命运共同体,推进"一带一路"建设等中国方案,为推动经济全球化朝着更加平等、开放、合作、包容、共赢的方向发展贡献出中国智慧。

　　【PC08】非政府组织、地方治理与海外投资风险——以湄公河下游水电开发为例　　韩叶（2019），《外交评论》，第1期，第81-112页。

　　近年来,在非政府组织倡导的反水电大坝的社会运动压力下,湄公河下游大规模水电开发的海外投资风险不断上升。下游各国通过吸引外资对跨界水资源进行水电开发以促进发展、改善民生,但在湄公河下游各种非政府组织的参与下,这种水治理形式引发了地方村社的不满,并逐渐转变为一场要求重构水资源治理权利的行动。湄公河下游非政府组织以"保护湄公河与地方居民权利"为共同信念,积极倡导地方治理规范,构建了一套关于地方治理的信念体系。同时,他们还通过框定与联系战略,建立"水电发展与脆弱群体权利"、"政策参与与公平正义的人权"等新议题,试图解构国家对湄公河下游水资源使用与治理的合法性。进而,他们通过建立倡议联盟、采取大规模动员等敌对性策略,最终将对国家管理的分散性不满,转化为要求进行地方治理的集体行动,并诱发了水电发展海外投资所面临的社会风险。因此,在进行海外投资的过程中,海外投资主体须关注所在国地方民众以及其他利益攸关者的利益诉求,承担相应的社会责任,也应重视当地非正式制度、社会关系网络对投资的影响,加强与非政府组织的沟通交流,更主动地掌控那些影响投资的风险因素。

　　【PC09】从制度之战到经济竞争：国内政治与美国对华政策的演变(2009～2018)　　王浩（2019），《当代亚太》，第1期，第38-55、156-157页。

　　美国的对华政策一直以来都是地缘政治与国内政治两种逻辑共同作用的产物。冷战后,由于国际体系结构与美国国内政治结构分别出现单极化与两极化的发展趋势,地缘政治逻辑在美国对华政策制定中的重要性显著下降,国内政治逻辑的影响则迅速上升。与之相应,经济取代安全成为中美关系的首要议题。自奥巴马政府执政起,随着中美两国步入战略竞争时代,地缘政治在美国对华政策制定中的重要性再次突显,并成为未来中长期中美战略互动的决定性变量。然而在这一宏观背景下,不同时期美国对华政策连同中美战略竞争的主题却是由美国国内政治所界定的:从奥巴马政府到特朗普政府,变化了的国内政治动因促使上述主题经历了从基于自由主义的规则约束与多边制度竞争到基于现实主义的合作型施压与双边经济竞争的演化。因此,美国国内政治的变化是观察今后美国对华政策走向的重要窗口。

　　【PC10】“一带一路”倡议与沿线国家债务风险：效应及作用机制　　邱煜、潘攀（2019），《财贸经济》，第12期，第96-111页。

　　近年来,随着中国国际影响力与日俱增,西方不时抛出针对中国方案的"阴谋论",引起了世界各国的广泛关注。为此,本文在构建理论模型分析"一带一路"倡议如何影响沿线国家债务风险及影响机理的基础上,利用2010—2017年"一带一路"沿线国家数据对理论模型进行实证检验,结果验证了理论模型预期。研究发现:(1)"一带一路"倡议有助于降低沿线国家债务风险;(2)从作用机制上看,"一带一路"倡议主要通过缩减沿线国债务规模和增强沿线国财政可持续性这两条路径影响沿线国债务风险水平;(3)进一步研究发现,参与倡议深度不同产生的债务风险抑制效应存在差异。具体来说,深度参与"一带一路"建设,即与中国签订了共建"一带一路"谅解备忘录的沿线国家,其债务风险更低。上述结论在经过工具变量法、Heckman两阶段分析、替换测度指标等一系列内生性检验后依然稳健。本文不仅从新的视角推进了对"一带一路"的研究,而且为国际社会更客观地认识和肯定中国方案提供了一定经验证据。

　　【PC11】高科技产业竞争的国际政治经济学分析　　李滨、陈怡（2019），《世界经济与政治》，第3期，第135-154、160页。

　　只有在生产过程中发生地位(生产关系)的变化,才会实现生产者权力与利益的变化。同样在国际层面,国家只有在国际分工体系中提升地位,才能实现其在世界经济政治中地位的变化。科学技术作为第一生产力是这种变革的最重要动力。由于新技术产业具有国际分工再组织的作用,目前在国际分工生产体系占据优势地位的发达国家不断强化对知识产权的保护,维护对核心技术的垄断,这既是维护既定国际分工体系的需要,更是维护既定国际利益分配和国际关系权力格局的需要。中国共产党第十九次全国代表大会提出新时代的总任务是实现现代化强国梦,完成中华民族的伟大复兴,其中一个重要的物质基础就是中国必须在国际分工体系中实现从中低端向高端的转型升级。在这一过程中,中国必然会遭遇来自传统上引领国际分工的发达国家的阻挠。这就是近来中国与美国高技术产业贸易纷争的最深刻的背景。只有从国际分工和国际生产关系的角度来审视中美围绕高技术产业政策的贸易纷争,才能洞察其背后的根本原因,发现其对中国发展的重要意义

　　【PC12】“中国债务陷阱论”剖析——以斯里兰卡政府债务问题为视角　　宋颖慧、王瑟、赵亮（2019），《现代国际关系》，第6期，第1-9、66页。

　　近年,有国际舆论指责中国通过合作项目为他国政府"制造债务陷阱",其中,斯里兰卡是最早被提出的"受害国"。斯政府债务问题系长期积弊,但中国和中国贷款均非主要成因。对此,国际舆论和学界曾全面深入予以研究,虽然大部分负面言论缺乏事实依据,但在美国等政治势力运作下仍形成"中国债务陷阱论"风潮。斯里兰卡案例在中国与"一带一路"沿线发展中国家合作中具有代表性,反映出政治互信打底、国企和国有资本为主的合作方式易被外界舆论攻击,未来"一带一路"倡议的推进尚需进一步完善有关合作细节。

　　【PC13】全球化、区域分化与民粹主义——选举地理视角下法国国民阵线的兴起　　田野、张倩雨（2019），《世界经济与政治》，第6期，第91-125、158-159页。

　　要素禀赋的相对变化使法国劳动力要素所有者内部发生分化,非熟练/半熟练劳动力和人力资本要素所有者形成了不同的政策偏好。由于生产要素在法国不同区域中的集聚性,两者的分化反映为法国各大区之间、城市中心区与郊区之间以及不同规模的城市之间的分化。由于传统制造业在发展中国家同类产品的竞争下走向衰落,法国非熟练/半熟练劳动力越来越难以找到合适的工作,同时他们还面临着来自南欧和北非的劳工移民以及近年来涌入的难民在就业机会和福利资源上的竞争。这种双重冲击使法国非熟练/半熟练劳动力产生了反全球化、反欧洲一体化、反移民的诉求,国民阵线因积极回应非熟练/半熟练劳动力的诉求而得到他们的政治支持,使其在多次总统选举中表现突出。受全球化和欧洲一体化冲击最为严重的是法国东北部"铁锈带"和地中海沿岸地区,法国北部、东部和地中海沿岸的很多大区因此成为国民阵线的主要票仓。此外,远离城市中心的远郊区和规模较小的城市集中了更多的非熟练/半熟练劳动力,因此这些区域的选民更多地把选票投给了国民阵线。法国国民阵线的兴起不仅重塑了法国的政党体系,也推动了民粹主义在欧洲政治乃至世界政治中的蔓延。

　　【PC14】援以止战：国际援助与国内武装冲突——来自中国对外援助的证据　　杨攻研、刘洪钟、范琳琳（2019），《世界经济与政治》，第11期，第129-156、160页。

　　国际援助能否减少国内武装冲突长期以来都是国际政治经济学关注的重要议题。近年来,中国对外援助规模和影响力的快速增长引发了众多学者的讨论。作者基于2000—2014年中国对外援助项目数据库,采用工具变量法实证研究了中国援助对受援国国内武装冲突的影响,从政治、经济双重视角挖掘了内在影响机制。结果显示,伴随中国援助的增加,受援国武装冲突的爆发概率和规模均显著下降,同时也促进了地区的和平与稳定;欧美以及世界银行等传统援助对武装冲突的抑制作用则并不明显。究其根源,一方面,中国水平模式的援助不仅为受援国带来显著的经济增长效应、提升了国家财政能力,而且通过资源配置效应重塑了国内经济格局、增强了经济发展的包容性;另一方面,中国援助的国内政治效应也会随后显现,国内民众支持率和政治凝聚力不断提高,地区分裂倾向和国家整体脆弱性显著降低,最终使得武装冲突风险得到有效缓解。这一研究有助于客观、全面地评价中国援助对受援国的影响,能基于"中国故事"对传统的援助—冲突理论进行反思,为增强全球援助体系的有效性提供了重要启示。

　　【PC15】贸易摩擦与日韩关系新变局　　李婷婷（2019），《现代国际关系》，第8期，第1-11、66页。

　　日韩贸易摩擦始于日本单方面加强对韩出口管制。日方决意对韩采取强硬措施的直接原因触发于韩国大法院的强征劳工索赔案判决,根本原因则体现了地区秩序重组背景下两国调整双边关系和地区战略的博弈,日本政策手段的选择上包含对政策有效性、风险性和战略性的多重考量。日韩对贸易摩擦与历史问题是挂钩还是双轨处理的原则上存在根本差异,对政策合理性的辩论也未能缩小分歧,但韩国政府的全方位外交和国内应对有助于在一定程度上降低摩擦的冲击预期。两国摩擦短期恐难消解,美国能否积极调解是影响其近期走向的关键。

　　【PC16】亚欧大陆跨境铁路的轨距问题　　李典易、陈勇（2019），《国际政治研究》，第6期，第87-122、7-8页。

　　铁路轨距是带有地缘政治属性的技术标准。亚欧大陆的铁路网可分为准轨区、俄轨区、印轨区、米轨区四大轨距区域,俄罗斯、欧盟和印度都在巩固和扩展各自的轨距空间。在一定程度上来说,中国是被俄轨区、印轨区、米轨区包围的东亚准轨铁路"孤岛",准轨发展空间严重受限,面临严峻的轨距地缘政治环境。中国的跨境铁路运输和建设都饱受轨距差异困扰。新建多条跨境铁路中,有些已达成准轨共识顺利推进,有些因为轨距分歧停滞不前。俄罗斯、欧盟、印度等大国和国家集团的轨距战略均凸显了轨距的地缘政治价值,中国集二线改轨教训值得汲取,即在追求经济利益的同时不能忽视战略价值。轨距问题的战略含义值得重视,但要考虑到相关国家的安全关切。中国制定未来的"轨距战略"要因地制宜,遵循"一国一策""一线一策"的原则,有针对性地提出方案。

　　【PC17】资本主义工业化、生产剩余国际分配与政治转型　　汪仕凯（2019），《世界经济与政治》，第4期，第129-153、160页。

　　民主政体有较高的经济成本,只能建立在较高的经济发展水平之上。资本主义工业化是实现财富增长的基本方式,因此成为民主政体得以建立和巩固的深层次根源。由于资本主义工业化是在世界范围内进行的,因而一个国家能否建立和巩固民主政体,将取决于它能否从资本主义工业化创造的全球生产剩余总额中获得足够支付民主政体经济成本的份额。一个国家在生产剩余国际分配中究竟能够争取到多大份额,则取决于这个国家在现代世界体系中的位置。生产剩余国际分配是高度不平等的,欧美国家分割了全球生产剩余中的大部分,因此它们最先建立了民主政体,第三世界国家由于只能在全球生产剩余分配中获得较少的份额,因而难以建立和巩固民主政体。只有当资本主义工业化创造的生产剩余足够多,即使在不平等的生产剩余国际分配中仍然能够获得足以支付民主政体经济成本的份额时,第三世界国家才能建立成熟的民主政体。世界大国之间的竞争将改变生产剩余国际分配的结果,中国复兴意味着其他国家得到的份额相应减少了,因此起源于欧美国家的自由民主体制将面临很大的变数。

　　【PC18】利益集团、权力结构与发展政策——对非洲国家经济发展的启示　　刘晨（2019），《世界经济与政治》，第6期，第126-154、159-160页。

　　20世纪90年代以来,非洲经济实现了迅速增长,非洲和东亚在国家发展政策上的显著差异成为备受关注的问题。通过建立分析框架,可尝试对其实施不同发展政策的原因做出解释:在国家工业化初期所面临的差异化的国际和国内环境形成了不同的约束条件,进而塑造了不同的国家行为。具体而言,韩国集中化的国内权力结构(不存在强大的分利集团)和分散性的国际权力结构(国家间的战争威胁),使国家既有动员社会资源的能力,又有将资源用于经济发展的意愿,从而形成"发展型政策";尼日利亚独立后,部族势力削弱了国家的发展能力,和平的国际环境使国家行为缺少外部约束,国家为维护统治地位而进行持续的资源掠夺,形成了"掠夺型政策";埃塞俄比亚有较为集中的国家权力,但同样缺乏外部约束的国际环境使国家得以获取大量资源实现短期增长,长期发展则面临挑战。非洲国家经济政策问题的根源在于其未能完成现代国家构建,在依赖部族维持生存的政治体系中,国家和部族均致力于争夺经济资源和政治权力,很难形成长远的政治和经济规划。因此,国际社会和非洲国家应一方面增强国家的发展能力,一方面增强国家行为的约束性,实现国家的个体理性和社会的集体理性的统一,这也是非洲实现长期发展的必然路径

　　【PC19】反恐融资领域的国际机制间合作——政治机会与决策程序的视角　　刘宏松、林海文（2019），《世界经济与政治》，第9期，第107-131、158-159页。

　　国际机制间合作需要满足能力互补和目标相容两个条件。在能力互补的两项国际机制之间需要达成目标相容,才能实现合作。政治机会可以改变源机制成员国对解决特定问题的优先性认识以及目标机制成员国对特定问题的紧迫性认识,从而促进相容目标的形成。目标机制的决策程序则会影响其成员国达成相容目标的难易程度。排除低等级政治机会和决策程序极为不利两种极端情形,存在高等级政治机会+决策程序较为有利、高等级政治机会+决策程序较为不利、中等级政治机会+决策程序较为有利、中等级政治机会+决策程序较为不利四种情形。在第一种情形下容易实现国际机制间合作。在第二种情形和第三种情形下,尽管存在不利条件,源机制仍然能够实现与目标机制的合作。在第四种情形下,不会出现国际机制间合作。通过对九一一事件之后金融行动特别工作组与国际货币基金组织及金融行动特别工作组与联合国在反恐融资领域合作的案例分析,上述四种情形的分析性预期得到了实证支持。

　　【PC20】构建互利共赢的国际政治经济学理论　　李滨、陈子烨（2019），《世界经济与政治》，第10期，第4-21、156-157页。

　　新时代国际政治经济学的一个重要主题就是探索互利共赢理论与路径。从理论上讲,要实现世界经济的互利共赢,首先必须发展生产力。这是互利共赢的物质基础。生产力发展的一个重要标志就是社会分工的扩大与深入。然而,社会分工生产中相关生产组织与交换方式在促进生产力发展过程中也会产生各种妨碍生产力发展的冲突与矛盾。这需要国家的调节来缓解与解决这些矛盾。经济全球化是一种超越国界的更大程度的社会化分工生产。它不仅会产生一般市场下组织生产过程中的矛盾与冲突,而且这些矛盾与冲突还会酿成国家之间的矛盾与冲突。然而,在一个民族国家体系中,由于分立的国家行为体的存在,缺乏单一的权威中心,唯有加强国家间合作,通过多中心的全球治理来缓解与解决这些矛盾。目前的全球经济治理还不适应现实的要求,必须进行改革。各国应当本着"共商、共建、共享"的多边主义精神,在改革全球经济治理上,以坚持经济全球化为导向,以促进发展为优先原则,兼顾各国的不同经济制度和利益诉求,允许各国以自身的方式与速率来适应经济全球化。唯有这样才能实现互利共赢。

　　4.国际政治经济学（其他部分）2019年最佳英文论文TOP10候选论文

　　【PE01】Did Austerity Cause Brexit?　　Fetzer, T. (2019). American Economic Review, 109(11), 3849-3886.

　　This paper documents a significant association between the exposure of an individual or area to the UK government's austerity-induced welfare reforms begun in 2010, and the following: the subsequent rise in support for the UK Independence Party, an important correlate of Leave support in the 2016 UK referendum on European Union membership; broader individual-level measures of political dissatisfaction; and direct measures of support for Leave. Leveraging data from all UK electoral contests since 2000, along with detailed, individual-level panel data, the findings suggest that the EU referendum could have resulted in a Remain victory had it not been for austerity.

　　【PE02】When Britain Turned Inward: The Impact of Interwar British Protection　　de Bromhead, A., Fernihough, A., Lampe, M. & O'Rourke, K. (2019). American Economic Review, 109(2), 325-352.

　　International trade collapsed, and also became much less multilateral, during the 1930s. Previous studies, looking at aggregate trade flows, have argued that trade policies had relatively little to do with either phenomenon. Using a new dataset incorporating highly disaggregated information on the United Kingdom's imports and trade policies, we find that while conventional wisdom is correct regarding the impact of trade policy on the total value of British imports, discriminatory trade policies can explain the majority of Britain's shift toward Imperial imports in the 1930s.

　　【PE03】Brexit and the Politics of UK Growth Models　　Rosamond, B. (2019). New Political Economy, 24(3), 408-421.

　　Brexit has reopened and repoliticised the debate about future growth models for the UK economy. This contribution argues that this debate is built around historically specific path dependencies that reflect the particular character of public debate about British political economy, while also suggesting that the debate around Brexit takes place at a very distinctive moment in the history of democratic capitalism in Europe. This combination gives the renewed politicisation a specific and perhaps perverse character. The paper considers how we should approach debates about growth models, paying particular attention to the importance of the politics of support. It suggests that recent debate about growth models has been largely subsumed within the politics of Brexit, which has politicised that debate, albeit through the emergent political economy frames that Brexit has provoked. The paper explores the ways in which the demise of three key props of European democratic capitalism – a sustained period of economic growth, a governing philosophy that subordinated the market to wider social purposes and strong political parties – play out in the context of Brexit and the search for a new politics of support.

　　【PE04】International agreements, economic sovereignty and exit　　Richardson, M. & St?hler, F. (2019). European Economic Review, 120: Article 103326.

　　We develop a model in which realisations of an ex ante uncertain domestic policy environment can make it attractive to a sovereign nation to renege on an international agreement. We show, in a fairly general setting in which the likelihood of exit is affected by the degree of cooperation, that the possibility of exit reduces the optimal degree of initial cooperation. “Full” cooperation will never be optimal, and the optimal degree of cooperation will never be such as to “squeeze out” any possibility of exit. However, an increase in global uncertainty may imply an increase in cooperation when exit risks are already large to begin with.

　　【PE05】Immigration and electoral support for the far-left and the far-right　　Edo, A., Giesing, Y., ?ztunc, J. & Poutvaara, P. (2019). European Economic Review, 115, 99-143.

　　Immigration is one of the most divisive political issues in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and several other Western countries. We estimate the impact of immigration on voting for far-left and far-right candidates in France, using panel data on presidential elections from 1988 to 2017. To derive causal estimates, we instrument more recent immigration flows by settlement patterns in 1968. We find that immigration increases support for far-right candidates. This is driven by low-educated immigrants from non-Western countries. We also find that immigration has a weak negative effect on support for far-left candidates, which could be explained by a reduced support for redistribution. We corroborate our analysis with a multinomial choice analysis using survey data.

　　【PE06】Globalization and state capitalism: Assessing Vietnam's accession to the WTO　　Baccini, L., Impullitti, G. & Malesky, E. J. (2019). Journal of International Economics, 119, 75-92.

　　What do state-owned enterprises (SOEs) do? How do they respond to market incentives? Can we expect substantial efficiency gains from trade liberalization in economies with a strong presence of SOEs? Using a new dataset of Vietnamese firms we document a set of empirical regularities distinguishing SOEs from private firms. Then we empirically study the effect of the 2007 WTO accession on selection, competition, and productivity. Our results show that WTO entry is associated with higher probability of exit, lower firm profitability, and substantial increases in productivity for private firms but not for SOEs. Our estimates suggest that the overall productivity gains would have been about 40% larger in a counterfactual Vietnamese economy without SOEs. We highlight some economic mechanisms possibly driving these findings through the lenses of a model of trade with heterogeneous private and state-owned firms. The model suggests that political/regulatory barriers to entry and access to credit are key drivers of the different response of SOEs to trade liberalization. Further empirical tests broadly validate these insights.

　　【PE07】International Institutions and Political Liberalization: Evidence from the World Bank Loans Program　　Carnegie, A. & Samii, C. (2019). British Journal of Political Science, 49(4), 1357-1379.

　　How do international institutions affect political liberalization in member states? Motivated by an examination of the World Bank loans program, this article shows that institutions can incentivize liberalization by offering opportunities for countries to become associated with advanced, wealthy members. In the World Bank, when a loan recipient reaches a specified level of economic development, it becomes eligible to graduate from borrower status to lender status. Using a regression discontinuity design, the study demonstrates that this incentive motivates states to improve their domestic behavior with respect to human rights and democracy. Combining qualitative and quantitative evidence, the results suggest that the desire to become a member of this elite group is responsible for motivating member states to reform due to the belief that such membership brings diffuse international and domestic benefits.

　　【PE08】The political economy of International Finance Corporation lending　　Dreher, A., Lang, V. & Richert, K. (2019). Journal of Development Economics, 140, 242-254.

　　Much of the International Finance Corporation's (IFC) lending benefits private companies from rich countries and supports projects in middle-income countries. Large corporations such as Lidl or M?venpick have received its loans for highly profitable investments. This contrasts to some extent with the IFC's official mandate, which is to finance poverty-reducing projects for which private capital is not available on reasonable terms. Investigating a potential driver of this mismatch, we argue that some governments can influence the allocation of IFC loans to the benefit of private companies in their countries. Using new data for more than 3000 IFC projects over the 1995–2015 period we show that (joint) IFC Board membership of countries where borrowing companies are based and of countries where the projects are implemented increases the likelihood that these countries receive IFC loans. This has implications for the debate on leveraging private-sector investments for development.

　　【PE09】When Reporting Undermines Performance: The Costs of Politically Constrained Organizational Autonomy in Foreign Aid Implementation　　Honig, D. (2019). International organization, 73(1), 171-201.

　　Bureaucracies with field operations that cannot be easily supervised and monitored by managers are caught between two sources of dysfunction that may harm performance. The first source of dysfunction is straightforward: field workers can use operating slack and asymmetric information to their own advantage, thwarting an organization's objectives. The second source of dysfunction is often overlooked: attempts to limit workers’ autonomy may have deleterious effects, curbing agents’ ability to respond efficaciously to the environment. I find that the parliaments and executive boards to whom International Development Organizations (IDOs) are accountable differentially constrain IDO organizational autonomy, which in turn affects management's control of field agents. Tight management control of field agents has negative effects, particularly in more unpredictable environments. Attempts by politicians to constrain organizations in an effort to improve performance can sometimes be self-undermining, having net effects opposite those intended.

　　【PE10】Concession Stands: How Mining Investments Incite Protest in Africa　　Christensen, D. (2019). International organization, 73(1), 65-101.

　　Foreign investment in Africa’s mineral resources has increased dramatically. This paper addresses three questions raised by this trend: do commercial mining investments increase the likelihood of social or armed conflict? If so, when are these disputes most prevalent? And, finally, what mechanisms help explain these conflicts? I show, first, that mining has contrasting effects on social and armed conflict: while the probability of protests or riots increases (roughly doubling) after mining starts, there is no increase in rebel activity. Second, I show that the probability of social conflict rises with plausibly exogenous increases in world commodity prices. Finally, I compile additional geo-spatial and survey data to explore potential mechanisms, including reporting bias, environmental harm, in-migration, inequality, and governance. Finding little evidence consistent with these accounts, I develop an explanation related to incomplete information—a common cause of conflict in industrial and international relations. This mechanism rationalizes why mining induces protest, why these conflicts are exacerbated by rising prices, and why transparency dampens the relationship between prices and protest.

　　【PE11】How do firms respond to political tensions? The heterogeneity of the Dalai Lama Effect on trade　　Lin, F., Hu, C. & Fuchs, A. (2019). China Economic Review, 54, 73-93.

　　Little is known about the firm-level dynamics behind trade responses to political tensions. This article reinvestigates variation in the travel pattern of the 14th Dalai Lama to study how political tensions affect trading decisions of Chinese importers. Using monthly trade data from China Customs covering imports of machinery and transport equipment from 173 countries over the 2000–2006 period, our empirical results show a significant reduction of imports in response to foreign government members' meetings with the Dalai Lama. In line with the idea that Chinese importers face a trade-off between bearing costs from suboptimal trade transactions and costs from not accommodating the government, this ‘Dalai Lama Effect’ operates at the intensive margin, i.e., via a decrease in the import volume per importer. Examining differential effects across types of firm ownership, we find that the observed effect is driven by state-owned enterprises (and foreign-invested firms) and not by private companies. Moreover, while direct importers temporarily reduce their trade with Dalai Lama-receiving countries, there is some evidence that trade intermediaries fill the void. Overall, we find the effects to be much more short-lived than previously thought.

　　【PE12】Power in global value chains　　Dallas, M., Ponte, S. & Sturgeon, T. (2019). Review of International Political Economy, 26(4), 666-694.

　　Power has been a foundational concept in global value chain (GVC) research. Yet, in most GVC scholarship, power is not explicitly defined and is applied as a unitary concept, rather than as having multiple dimensions. Clarifying the concept of power has become particularly urgent in recent years as GVC research has proliferated beyond dyads of transacting firms or firm-state linkages and incorporated other stakeholders and mechanisms such as NGOs, labor unions, standards, norms and conventions. In this article, we propose a typology for the varied meanings and usages of power in GVC governance. We delineate two principal dimensions: transmission mechanisms – direct and diffuse; and arena of actors – dyads and collectives. Combined, these two dimensions yield four ideal types of power in GVC governance: bargaining, demonstrative, institutional and constitutive. We offer brief illustrations of these four types of power and provide an agenda for further research in the field.

　　【PE13】Effects of the Great Recession on American Attitudes Toward Trade　　Mansfield, E., Mutz, D. & Brackbill, D. (2019). British Journal of Political Science, 49(1), 37-58.

　　Did the American public become more protectionist during the Great Recession of 2007–09? If so, why? During this period, many observers expressed concern that rising unemployment would stimulate protectionist pressures. The results of this study indicate that although increased unemployment did not affect the trade preferences of most Americans, individuals working in import-competing industries who lost their jobs during the Great Recession did grow more hostile to trade. However, even greater hostility to trade stemmed from a variety of non-material factors. Increasing ethnocentrism and opposition to involvement in world affairs between 2007 and 2009 help account for growing antipathy toward trade. But most importantly, increasing anxiety that foreign commerce would harm people in the future, even if it had not done so thus far, contributed to mounting opposition to trade among the American public.

　　【PE14】International Investment Law and Foreign Direct Reinvestment　　Wellhausen, R. (2019). International organization, Volume 73(4), 839-858.

　　One goal of the law is to provide a means to return disputing parties to cooperation. The prevailing expectation is that international investment law largely does not do this; rather, an aggrieved foreign investor sues the host state as a last resort and divests. I use a new database of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) arbitrations and firm-level bilateral investment to show that, in fact, claimant investors reinvestinthehoststateatleast31percentofthetime(between1990and2015).Among investors who file for arbitration, and controlling for sector, important correlates of reinvestment include the claimant’slegalstrategy; the extent of the claimant’s grievance andsuccess;andtheincidenceofpost-arbitrationlitigation.Despiteuniqueaspectsofits institutional design, the de facto international investment regime can help solve host state time-inconsistency problems consistent with standard expectations of law. Whether the probability of reinvestment is high enough to reinforce host state commitments to this controversial regime is an open question.

　　Thousands of international investment agreements and contracts that include Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) clauses allow foreign investors to sue host states directly for compensation regarding alleged property rights violations— in ad hoc tribunals without a formal appeals system, without the approval of their home states, and often without exhausting local courts in the host state. Just being sued may signal increased political risks to third-party investors, pulling down foreign investment overall.1 A host state worried about litigation may delay enacting otherwise preferred policies if those policies could adversely affect foreign investors, a phenomenon known as “regulatory chill.”2 And, despite years of econometric machinations, scholars have found it difficult to demonstrate that host state commitments to ISDS attract investment—the key motivation for host states to sign on in the first place.3 Unsurprisingly, the backlash against ISDS and its potential to constrain states’ sovereignty grows as more arbitrations arise.4 Dozens of states are renegotiating enabling treaties, with some pulling out unilaterally, although none of the 120

　　【PE15】Once Bitten,Twice Shy? Investment Disputes,State Sovereignty,and Change in Treaty Design　　Thompson, A., Broude, T. & Haftel, Y. (2019). International organization, Volume 73(4), 859-880.

　　More than 3,000 international investment agreements (IIAs) provide foreign investors with substantive protections in host states and access to binding investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). In recent years, states increasingly have sought to change their treaty commitments through the practices of renegotiation and termination, so far affecting about 300 IIAs. The received wisdom is that this development reflects a “backlash” against the regime and an attempt by governments to reclaim sovereignty, consistent with broader antiglobalization trends. Using new data on the degree to which IIA provisions restrict state regulatory space (SRS), we provide the first systematic investigation into the effect of ISDS experiences on state decisions to adjust their treaties. The empirical analysis indicates that exposure to investment claims leads either to the renegotiation of IIAs in the direction of greater SRS or to their termination. This effect varies, however, with the nature of involvement in ISDS and with respect to different treaty provisions.

　　【PE16】Trasformismo or transformation? The global political economy of energy transitions　　Newell, P. (2019). Review of International Political Economy, 26(1), 25-48.

　　What does IPE have to contribute to pressing policy and academic debates about the urgently required transition to a low carbon global economy? Despite the obviously global, political and economic dimensions of such a transition, insights from IPE have yet to be brought to bear on the question of what form such a transition might take: the relations of power which will frustrate or enable it; the historical precedents for previous transformations in dominant structures of production, finance and technology in the global economy; and the potentially central role of the state and institutions of global governance. This article seeks to contribute to the analysis of transitions grounded in different strands of literature from neo-Gramscian and historical materialist IPE and political economy more broadly. It focuses, in turn, on the role of the state in transitions; the ways in which the globalization of the global economy structures the possibility and likely form of transitions; and the role of global governance institutions in key energy and economic domains. It calls for energy to take up its rightful place as a lens for understanding and revising orthodox comprehensions of political, economic and social processes.

　　【PE17】Internationalizing the political economy of hydroelectricity: security, development and sustainability in hydropower states　　Sovacool, B. K. & Walter, G. (2019). Review of International Political Economy, 26(1), 49-79.

　　Our study offers a comparative assessment of the economic, sociopolitical and environmental implications of the world’s largest source of renewable electricity, hydropower. Theorists from many disciplines have questioned both the proper role and ostensible benefits from the generation of electricity from large-scale hydroelectric dams. In this study, we use 30 years of World Bank data from 1985 to 2014 and a research design with three mutually exclusive reference classes of countries: major hydropower producers, members of OPEC and all other countries. This is precisely so our analysis moves away from ‘dam-centric’ or single case study approaches to comparative analysis at the international scale. We examine and test six separate hypotheses related to (a) military conflict, (2) poverty, (3) economic growth, (4) public debt, (5) corruption and (6) greenhouse gas emissions. Our analysis lends statistical support to the idea that there is such a thing as a ‘hydroelectric resource curse’, although effects were not always significant and varied from small, medium to large. The possible benefits of hydroelectricity—improved energy access, economic development and positive spillover effects—are real, but they are all too frequently constrained. Planners, investors and researchers may therefore need to rethink their underlying assumptions about how they evaluate hydropower’s risk.

　　【PE18】War,International Finance,and Fiscal Capacity in the Long Run　　Queralt, D. (2019). International organization, Volume 73(4), 713-753.

　　In this article I revisit the relationship between war and state making in modern times by focusing on two prominent types of war finance: taxes and foreign loans. Financing war with tax money enhances the capacity to assess wealth and monitor compliance, namely fiscal capacity. Tax-financed war facilitates the adoption of power-sharing institutions, which transform taxation into a non-zero-sum game, carrying on the effect of war in the long run. Financing war with external capital does not contribute to long-term fiscal capacity if borrowers interrupt debt service and, as part of the default settlement, war debt is condoned or exchanged for nontax revenue. The empirical evidence draws from war around the world as early as 1816. Results suggest that globalization of capital markets in the nineteenth century undermined the association between war, state making, and political reform.

　　【PE19】What We Have Learned about Terrorism since 9/11　　Gaibulloev, K. & Sandler, T. (2019). Journal of Economic Literature, 57(2), 275-328.

　　This overview piece examines critically the post-9/11 empirical literature on terrorism. Major contributions by both economists and political scientists are included. We focus on five main themes: the changing nature of terrorism, the organization of terrorist groups, the effectiveness of counterterrorism policies, modern drivers or causes of terrorism, and the economic consequences of terrorism. In so doing, we investigate a host of questions that include: How terrorist groups attract and retain members? What determines the survival of terrorist groups? Is poverty a root cause of terrorism? What counterterrorism measures work best? In the latter regard, we find that many counterterrorism policies have unintended negative consequences owing to attack transference and terrorist backlash. This suggests the need for novel policies such as service provision to counter some terrorist groups’ efforts to provide such services. Despite terrorists’ concerted efforts to damage targeted countries’ economies, the empirical literature shows that terrorism has had little or no consequences on economic growth or GDP except in small terrorism-plagued countries. At the sectoral level, terrorism can adversely affect tourism and foreign direct investment, but these effects are rather transient and create transference of activities to other sectors, thus cushioning the consequences.

　　【PE20】The politics of state compliance with international “soft law” in finance　　Quaglia, L. (2019). Governance, 32(1), 45-62.

Why do jurisdictions comply (or not) with international soft law in finance? This research systematically links international and domestic explanations of compliance by highlighting the “disjuncture” between the international standard‐setting process and the process of domestic compliance. Two causal mechanisms that affect compliance are identified. In the uploading stage, elected officials delegate the making of international soft law to domestic regulators; large, internationally active financial institutions mobilize extensively and, to a large extent, successfully. In the downloading stage, domestic interest groups team up with elected officials in order to resist compliance with international soft law that has negative distributional implications for domestic constituencies. These arguments are illustrated through a structured, focused comparison, and process tracing of the mixed record of compliance of the two main jurisdictions worldwide—the United States and the European Union—with the main international banking standards, the Basel Accords.